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The capital structure of Chinese listed firms: Is manufacturing industry 
special? 
Abstract 
 
Purpose - This paper examines whether or not industry membership can explain the leverage of 
Shanghai listed firms prior to the 2007 financial crisis. In view of the central role that the 
manufacturing industry played in China’s rise as a global economic power, we are particularly 
interested in whether or not manufacturing is a special case. 
 
Design/methodology/approach - The paper undertakes a comparative study of leverage 
differences between manufacturing and non-manufacturing industry firms on a cross-section and 
time-series basis. This is supplemented by a regression analysis that models the factors 
determining leverage on an industry-by-industry basis. 
 
Findings - We find that leverage levels differ across industries because of industry-based 
differences in financial characteristics. It is also found that, despite playing a leading role in 
China’s economic development, there is no evidence to suggest that manufacturing is a special 
case. Across all sectors borrowing-power-related variables were identified to be important 
determinants of leverage and, contrary to our expectations, factors relating to profitability were 
largely insignificant.   
 
Research limitations/implications - The Trade Off and Pecking Order capital structure theories 
found to be commonly applicable to firms in the in the Western business environment do not 
appear to adequately explain capital structure in China. 
 
Originality/value - We identify evidence to suggest that China needs to be treated as a ‘special 
case’ in the context of capital structure theory due to the unique cultural and business 
environment.  
 
Keywords Capital Structure, Chinese listed companies, Manufacturing industry, Cultural factors 
 
Paper type Research Paper  
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1. Introduction, literature and hypotheses 
It is not clear how relevant established Western capital structure theories are to Chinese capital 
markets. For example, Tse and Rodgers (2011) demonstrate that the Tax Shield capital structure 
model did not apply in the Chinese context. Other Western based research suggests that industry 
membership can explain between-industry variations of leverage (For example, Tse (2002) in 
relation to the UK). This paper examines whether or not this is also the case for Shanghai listed 
companies given the cultural and institutional differences between China and Western countries. 
 
1.1 Behavioural, Cultural and Institutional influences on capital structure 
Evidence in the literature suggests that capital structure can be influenced by behavioural factors.  
For example, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) found that financially aggressive CEOs showed a 
tendency to use higher leverage than their more conservative peers. A number of other studies 
also indicate that over optimism bias can be a significant issue; Hackbarth (2008) found that over 
confident managers tend to issue more debt and are less likely to follow a standard pecking 
order. From a cultural perspective Chui et al. (2002) argue that a nation’s culture can affect 
corporate capital structures. Their cross-country study found that countries with high degrees of 
cultural ‘conservatism’ tend to have lower corporate debt ratios. This is particularly important in 
China where the interests of the individual are seen as relatively less important than those of the 
group. The importance of cultural factors in China was highlighted by Kai Li et al. (2011) who 
report that national culture has significant explanatory power in the financial leverage decisions 
of foreign joint ventures. Chui et al. (2002) conclude by asking if national culture is the missing 
part of the capital structure puzzle and ask whether this is related to attitudes to saving. A 
conservative attitude to savings appears to be a Pan-Chinese phenomenon and not just restricted 
3 
 
to the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Tung and Baumann (2009) found that Chinese who 
were born and raised overseas had similar attitudes in this respect to their counterparts in the 
PRC. 
    Institutional factors may also possibly influence capital structures. A key distinguishing 
feature of Chinese capital markets in this respect is the high proportion of listed company shares 
held by the state. Wei and Geng (2008) argue that this reduces the effectiveness of corporate 
governance. The overall impact of state ownership on capital structures is however disputed in 
the literature.  Liu et al. (2011) argue that state-owned enterprises (SOE) have higher leverage 
ratios than their non-SOEs peers and are also more market driven. However, Tse and Rodgers 
(2011) argue that tax incentive effects mean that the impact of government share holdings on 
capital structure is unclear as increasing corporate borrowing will reduce government tax 
revenue through tax shield effects. Huang and Song (2011) on the other hand argue that state 
ownership has no significant influence on capital structure decision in Chinese firms.  
 
1.2 Pecking Order and Trade-Off theories of Capital Structure 
These are the two principle (and competing) capital structure theories found in the Western 
literature. Pecking Order Theory (POT) argues that firms have clear preferences in their sources 
of funding. Internal funds are normally identified as being at the top of the pecking order and, as 
a consequence, a negative relationship is predicted between leverage and profitability (more 
profitable firms will undertake less external borrowing). There is a debate in the literature as to 
the precise structure of the pecking order. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that new debt finance 
will be preferred to equity as new equity can be taken as a signal by investors that managers 
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believe the firm’s equity to be overvalued. However, Lien et al. (2012) found evidence of a 
reverse pecking order in China; firms were found to prefer to issue shares rather than debt. 
   Trade Off theory argues that firms will determine their capital structures by trading off the 
costs and benefits associated with different sources of finance. For example, long term debt use 
is determined by the trade-off between the risk of possible bankruptcy and the tax savings 
associated with debt finance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) extended the model 
to incorporate the agency cost problem and subsequently Baker et al. (2007) argued that debt 
financing is a potential agency cost control mechanism as it reduces free cash flow and 
encourages the monitoring of management by debt providers.  
 
1.3 Industry membership and capital structure in the literature 
The mix of debt-to-equity has been found to differ from industry-to-industry (Kim, 1997) and 
also from country-to-country (Wald, 1999). Country based differences may possibly reflect 
differences in tax regimes if firms are adjusting their leverage to optimise tax shield benefits. To 
take advantage of tax shields firms need to have good earnings potential and tangible assets to 
back up any borrowing. These two associated elements are commonly called debt capacity. A 
study of Chinese firms by Cai et al. (2008) suggested that, although long term debt was small 
and accounted for only 23% of total debt, the availability of collateralized assets did have a 
significant influence on the debt maturity profile. 
   A number of other studies argue that both industry-related and country-related factors can 
explain differences in leverage levels. For example, Remmers et al. (1974) found that industry-
related factors were significant in Japan and France but not in the United States (US), the 
Netherlands and Norway. A subsequent study by Sekely and Collins (1988), that examined 677 
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firms in 9 industries across 23 countries, argued that country level effects are possibly more 
important than industry level effects. They put these differences down to cultural influences. 
More recently Jong et al. (2008) also reported country-related influences on firms’ leverage 
levels and MacKay and Phillips (2005) argue that, in the US at least, financial structures are 
determined at firm level rather than industry level. 
   Although the literature in respect to industry-based leverage effects is somewhat equivocal, we 
argue in this paper that if Western capital structure models are applicable to Chinese firms we 
would expect to find some evidence of industry–based leverage effects. The literature in respect 
to the impact of China’s rapid economic growth on capital structures is very limited. In 
particular, we can find no substantive research that attempts to examine industry-related 
differences in these capital structures. This issue is of particular interest given that the evidence 
suggests China may eventually become the biggest economy in the world. 
   Any industry-based leverage effects could, we argue, potentially be a function of the level of 
debt capacity. Woodruff  (2007), using US data covering 2001-2005, identified debt capacity as 
being potentially a function of four factors: the proportion of property and plant and equipment 
in total assets, industry group (because of asset specificity), sales variability and the depreciation 
method used. He found the first two factors to be statistically significant in explaining the debt 
capacity. Higher debt capacity was particularly pronounced in respect to the (non-high 
technology) manufacturing industry. This is possibly not surprising as firms in this industry 
produce similar products and services and also utilize assets that have similar asset specificity 
risk (Espahbodi et al., 2002). 
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   The principal conceptual argument of this paper is that growing industries with high levels of 
tangible assets (for use as collateral) and with high levels of profit growth will borrow more. 
Therefore, we would expect there to be substantial differences in leverage-related financing 
behaviour between manufacturers and other industries.  
 
1.4 Hypotheses and contributions 
Following our review of literature presented above, we establish the following testable 
hypotheses: 
1. Amongst profitable Chinese listed companies leverage is industry dependent;   
2. Leverage will be significantly higher in the manufacturing industry; 
3. Industry-based differences in leverage can be explained in terms debt capacity 
(borrowing power and profitability) differencesi. 
Using a market competition based perspective Guney et al. (2011) found some evidence to 
suggest that industry factors may affect Chinese firms borrowing level. We, however, examine 
this issue from a debt capacity perspective. This paper contributes to the literature as follows: 
 
1. By examining the extent to which capital structure decisions are industry-dependent for 
Shanghai stock market listed firms. A particular focus is placed on the manufacturing industry 
given its preeminent role in driving Chinese economic development. We examine whether or not 
it is a ‘special case’ in terms of the ways in which it uses leverage given its need to raise large 
amounts of new capital. 
2.  By identifying innovative variables that are arguably better proxies for ‘borrowing power’ 
than those found in the current literature. We identify two groups of explanatory variables which, 
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we argue, are highly industry-dependent and use these in a direct test of the industry membership 
hypothesis. We argue that this approach is novel in the context of the literature. Previous tests of 
industry membership theory, for example Talberge et al. (2008), rely on general capital structure 
models rather than developing a direct test. 
 
3. By presenting evidence that profitability related factors are not important influences on 
leverage levels in Chinese firms. This calls into question whether or not both Pecking Order and 
Trade-Off theories can be applied to Chinese firms. We argue that this surprising finding may 
relate to Chinese cultural factors; specifically, that the negative attitude of the Chinese towards 
borrowing at personal level appears also to be reflected in corporate culture. 
 
   The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the dataset and our sampling 
procedures. Section 3 is a cross section and time series comparative study of leverage differences 
in manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. Section 4 uses regression analysis to model 
the factors determining leverage on an industry-by-industry basis. Section 5 discusses whether or 
not China is a special case in the context of capital structure theory and finally Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data Description 
Our sample is drawn from Shanghai Stock Exchange ‘A’ share index as at November 25th 2008. 
The principal source is the Reuters 3000 Xtra global financial database. At this time there were 
852 companies that had been listed on a continuous basis from 2002 to 2007. After excluding 21 
finance industry companies, this left an initial sample of 831. The data, shown on an industry 
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basis, is summarised in Table 1. Data was not used beyond 2007 in order to avoid potential 
complications associated with global financial crisis and to maintain a relatively ‘normalised’ 
data set corresponding to a relatively stable economic environmentii. 
   The data set was further adjusted to include only firms that used long term debt finance and 
were also in a position to make adjustments to their leverage ratios. For example, a significant 
number of companies with negative equity that were financed predominantly through their 
current liabilities are excluded from the sample. The omission of a large number of cases would 
normally indicate that potential sample selection bias issues would need to be examined as part 
of any statistical procedures. However, in this study this issue does not arise as the analysis being 
undertaken is conditional on the cases in the sample having the potential to make significant 
adjustments to long-term debt.  
   Based on the criteria identified above we exclude firms that: had negative pre-tax profits, that 
historically have made no use of long-term debt (LTD) finance, that had negative equity, that had 
annual EBIT growth exhibiting excessive volatility (growth changes by 10 fold or more) and 
finally some obvious outliers where current liabilities exceed half of total liabilities and interest 
paid is more than LTD. The final exclusion is more data related; the sample omits firms where it 
is likely that a significant part of the interest paid related to short-term borrowing costs. This 
approach is taken because the data-set used does not enable the identification of separate short-
term loan and long-term loan interest payments. This means that where there are significant 
short-term loans, the use of such data would introduce a significant upwards bias in estimates of 
long-term borrowing costs. This problem cannot be eliminated, but to minimize it we omit firms 
with high current liabilities relative to total liabilities as they are likely to have significant short 
term loans (such as bank loans). We assume that if these firms were also paying large interest 
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payments relative to their LTD, then a substantial proportion of these payments are unlikely to 
relate to the LTD. 
 
2.1 Preliminary analysis of the data 
Given China’s export orientation, manufacturing companies dominate market listings in terms of 
firm numbers; they represent 55% of the initial sample shown in Table 1. The next biggest 
industry group is I.T. services representing around 6.6%. The test-sample dataset shown in the 
second column is reasonably representative; for example, manufactures and I.T. services account 
for 53% and 5.1% respectively. It can be noted that there was significant between-industry 
variation in average firm size, as measured by total assets. The mining/oil industry stands out in 
this respect. 
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 Table 1: Companies listed on Shanghai ‘A’ stock exchange on a continuous basis 
2002-2007 shown by industry 
 
Industry Total 
listeda 
Test 
Sample 
Average sizeb Mean debt 
borrowing 
capacity c 
St. deviation T-test d 
 
Total   831 550 15.25 0.48 0.23     - 
Manufacturing 461 292 4.84 0.45 0.19 - 
Agriculture 24 15 1.98 0.42 0.11 - 1.24 
Conglomerates 44 25 8.43 0.50 0.22 1.46 
Construction 41 19 14.13 0.32 0.21 -3.83*** 
Utilities 39 34 15.84 0.76 0.13 13.7*** 
I.T. 55 28 5.05 0.30 0.16 -6.43*** 
Mining/Oil 19 18 101.1 0.56 0.15 3.10*** 
Real Estate 29 24 7.73 0.23 0.24 -4.84*** 
Wholesale/Retail 43 36 3.73 0.50 0.25 1.28 
Others 76 59 2.83 0.65 0.22 7.48*** 
  
Notes:   aAs at November 25th 2008; bAverage size of sample companies measured by Total Assets (shown in units of 1 billion 
Yuan and sourced from financial statements for 2007); cTFA/TA sourced from financial statements for 2007; whilst there is no 
generally accepted definition of debt borrowing capacity identifiable in the literature, the measurement used here can be 
viewed as a proxy. Total Fixed assets exclude intangibles; dComparison-of-means T-test comparing manufacturing industry 
debt borrowing capacity against other industries.  
 
Table 1 identifies large industry-related differences in estimated mean debt borrowing capacityiii. 
We use T-tests to test the significance of the mean-differences between manufacturing and other 
industries. The statistical significance found suggests that borrowing capacity variation may be 
industry-based and therefore any industry-based leverage differences may have a common cause. 
We plot a graph, Figure 1, which gives an indication that, with the possible expectation of two 
industries, Real Estates and Construction, there appears to be a positive relationship between 
borrowing capacity and leverage. 
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Figure 1: Average Debt Capacity vs. Average Leverage for 2007 in selected industriesa 
 
 
Notes: aEstimates derived from Tables 1 and 2a 
 
3. Hypotheses 1 and 2: results and analysis 
 
A series of F-statistic based comparison-of-means hypothesis tests are undertaken to identify 
whether or not leverage levels found in the ‘base case’ of manufacturing firms are statistically 
significantly different from those of other industries. From these we hope to be able to identify 
whether or not manufacturing is a ‘special case’ as per Hypothesis 2. These same tests will also 
provide evidence as to whether or not there is evidence to support Hypothesis 1.  
   With Chinese economic growth being in the region of 10% per year over the period in question 
(2002-2007) the financial structures and profitability rates of the sample-set of companies were 
relatively volatility. Therefore in order to ensure the robustness of our analysis we examine 
leverage levels on a year-by-year basis and, in addition for comparative purposes, use two 
different definitions of leverage. We believe that survivor bias is not an issue in our time-series 
analysis as, despite the rapid rate of economic growth, the de-listing of a company is a rare event 
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in Chinaiv.  It can also be noted from Tables 2 and 3 that the individual industry samples do not 
show large year-on-year variation. 
   Although the manufacturing industry did not show the highest average debt borrowing capacity 
in Table 1, the mean EBIT levels were high relative to average firm size and the EBIT standard 
deviation was relatively lowv. It might be expected that this, combined with lower perceived 
default risk resulting from the fact that the Chinese economic boom has been based mainly on 
the manufacturing industry, may have potentially made borrowing easier for manufacturers 
relative to other industries. We would therefore expect that Chinese manufacturing firms should 
borrow significantly more than, for example, construction and real estate, where there is 
substantially lower borrowing capacity. 
   Tables 2 and 3 report the results from a series leverage comparison tests undertaken on a year-
by-year basis over the period 2002-2007. The two tables are based on two alternative measures 
of the leverage widely found in the empirical literature (LTD/E and LTD/TA). This approach is 
taken so that comparisons can be made for robustness. It can be noted that in the empirical 
literature a number of different definitions of the numerator are found. For example, De Miguel 
and Pindado (2001) use market value whilst Titman and Wessels (1988) use book value. We 
argue that the use of market value is inappropriate for this particular study because any tax shield 
effect of borrowing is determined by the amount of interest payable on the debt and not the 
market value. 
   Hypothesis 1 postulates that leverage levels are industry dependant. It can be seen from Tables 
2 and 3 that there is considerable variation in leverage between industries; Table 2a shows that in 
2007 leverage ranges between 0.69 (utilities industry) and 0.15 (I.T. industry). The statistical 
significance of the difference between the ‘base case’ manufacturing industry and some of the 
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other industry groups provides some support for our first hypothesis (this is not conclusive as we 
undertake no formal significance test in respect to other industry base case groups). An 
examination of the changes in mean leverage over time indicates marginal increases across most 
industries. It can also be noted that there is evidence of greater leverage volatility in some 
individual industries. It is possibly a little surprising that the trend towards increasing leverage 
has not been greater given the need for increasing capital in a rapidly expanding economy has 
been accompanied by increases in levels of Chinese debt issuance (Hale, 2007). 
  
Table 2a:   
A comparison of manufacturing company mean leverage ratios with other industries 
(leverage: Long-Term Debt/Shareholder Equity) 
 
The mean leverage ratio of manufacturing industry companies is compared against those of companies from other 
industries over the period 2002-2007. The F-values relate to comparison-of-mean tests where the degrees of freedom 
use the Satterthwaite approximationa.  
 
The mean manufacturing leverage ratio is higher than that of other industries in half of the cases. This is not related 
to debt capacity as, for example, construction and real estate have a lower debt capacity than manufacturing. The 
statistical significance of the industry-related differences found was limited. This partly reflects wide within-
industry leverage variations within some industries.   
 
Industry 2007 2006 2005 
 
Sample 
Mean  
leverage F-value 
 
Sample 
Mean  
leverage 
 
F-value Sample 
Mean 
Leverage F-value 
         
 
Manufacturing 292 0.337  282 0.308        268 0.338        
          
Agriculture 15 0.225 1.769 12 0.154       2.440 10 0.187       5.426** 
Conglomerates 25 0.382 0.109 28 0.331       0.075 24 0.609       1.473 
Construction 19 0.584 2.622 18 0.491       1.871 17 0.492       0.422 
Utilities 34 0.690 5.471** 33 0.769       9.622*** 32 0.652       4.607** 
IT 28 0.149 9.811*** 25 0.163       3.406* 20 0.131       16.071*** 
Mining/Oil 18 0.314 0.048 17 0.219      0.048 16 0.463       0.500 
Real Estate 24 0.573 3.940* 18 0.573       3.521* 15 0.498       2.276 
Wholesale/Retail 36 0.198 7.629** 26 0.258           7.629** 33 0.199       3.036* 
          
Notes: ***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%;  adf = [( (s2 1+s2)2 )/( ( [(s12)/(n1-1)]+[(s22)/(n2-1)] ) )] 
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Table 2b:   
A comparison of manufacturing company mean leverage ratios with other industries 
(leverage: Long-Term Debt/Shareholder Equity) 
 
The mean leverage ratio of manufacturing industry companies is compared against those of companies from other 
industries over the period 2002-2007. The F-values relate to comparison-of-mean tests where the degrees of freedom 
use the Satterthwaite approximationa.  
 
It can be noted that leverage is trending upwards over time. This is especially apparent in industries such as utilities 
which increase from 0.34 in 2002 to 0.69 in 2007. 
 
Industry 2004 2003 2002 
 
Sample 
Mean  
leverage F-value 
 
Sample 
Mean  
leverage 
 
F-value Sample 
Mean 
Leverage F-value 
         
 
Manufacturing 303 0.295        313 0.252        287 0.228        
          
Agriculture 11 0.211 2.067 19 0.270       0.032 18 0.194       0.274 
Conglomerates 30 0.389       0.676 33 0.364       0.789 27 0.125       11.036*** 
Construction 16 0.339 0.137 14 0.257       0.004 13 0.369       3.132 
Utilities 33 0.596       9.017*** 32 0.522       9.537*** 33 0.335       3.505* 
IT 23 0.176       2.891* 26 0.260       0.005 31 0.179       0.352 
Mining/Oil 18 0.375       0.507 16 0.358       0.700 12 0.281       0.204 
Real Estate 14 0.502   1.494 15 0.285       0.184 13 0.316       0.574 
Wholesale/Retail 36 0.248      0.624 37 0.299       0.151 39 0.225       0.001 
          
Notes: ***Significant at 1%; *Significant at 10%; a df = [( (s2 1+s2)2 )/( ( [(s12)/(n1-1)]+[(s22)/(n2-1)] ) )] 
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Table 3a:   
A comparison of manufacturing company mean leverage ratios with other industries 
(leverage: Long-Term Debt/Total Assets) 
 
The mean leverage ratio of manufacturing industry companies is compared against those of companies from other 
industries over the period 2002-2007. The F-values are estimated as in Table 2.  
 
The absolute measures of leverage are significantly different from Table 2 estimates. However, there is little 
difference in the relative leverage of manufacturing and other industries indicating that the results of the modelling 
procedures are robust from the perspective of leverage definition. In comparison with Table 2, the statistical 
significance of between-industry differences exhibits greater consistency over time. This probably reflects this 
measure being less sensitive to changes in the value of the denominator. 
 
Industry 2007 2006 2005 
 
Sample 
Mean  
leverage F-value 
 
Sample 
Mean  
leverage 
 
F-value Sample 
Mean 
Leverage F-value 
         
 
Manufacturing 292 0.109  282 0.100        268 0.104        
          
Agriculture 15 0.086 0.095 12 0.051 4.159* 10 0.077 2.043 
Conglomerates 25 0.113 0.026 28 0.103       0.022 24 0.081 1.843 
Construction 19 0.101 0.070 18 0.104       0.016 17 0.106       0.007 
Utilities 34 0.190 8.099*** 33 0.204       11.804*** 32 0.219       13.381*** 
IT 28 0.048 15.711*** 25 0.046 18.172*** 20 0.054 9.823*** 
Mining/Oil 18 0.126 0.327 17 0.101       0.003 16 0.126       0.776 
Real Estate 24 0.172 6.371** 18 0.175       4.810** 15 0.139       4.312** 
Wholesale/Retail 36 0.067 6.850** 26 0.074 2.823* 33 0.050 17.370*** 
          
Notes: ***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%.  
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Table 3b:   
A comparison of manufacturing company mean leverage ratios with other industries 
(leverage: Long-Term Debt/Total Assets) 
 
The mean leverage ratio of manufacturing industry companies is compared against those of companies from other 
industries over the period 2002-2007. The F-values are estimated as in Table 2.  
 
Industry 2004 2003 2002 
 
Sample 
Mean  
leverage F-value 
 
Sample 
Mean  
leverage 
 
F-value Sample 
Mean 
Leverage F-value 
         
 
Manufacturing 303 0.104        313 0.098  287 0.092  
          
Agriculture 11 0.093 0.288 19 0.099 0.001 18 0.086 0.044 
Conglomerates 30 0.113       0.120 33 0.105       0.078 27 0.053 11.988*** 
Construction 16 0.113       0.065 14 0.076 0.985 13 0.100 0.231 
Utilities 33 0.213       18.473*** 32 0.207       18.639*** 33 0.161       8.111*** 
IT 23 0.057 6.485*** 26 0.071 1.225 31 0.052 4.928** 
Mining/Oil 18 0.139       1.421 16 0.144       1.661 12 0.134 0.708 
Real Estate 14 0.142       2.061 15 0.127      0.714 13 0.126 0.870 
Wholesale/Retail 36 0.074 6.333** 37 0.074 2.760* 39 0.059 3.983* 
          
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. 
 
 
   Although the borrowing capacity estimates in Table 1 and the leverage estimates in Tables 2 
and 3 are not fully comparable (due to small sampling differences) inferences can be drawn on 
an indicative basis. Table 1 identifies utilities as showing high levels of borrowing capacity and 
from Tables 2 and 3 we can observe that this industry also shows the highest leverage ratios. 
Reference to Figure 1 also suggests a generally positive relationship between leverage and 
borrowing capacity. However, rather surprisingly low borrowing capacity industries such as 
construction and real estate exhibit relatively high levels of leverage (Figure 1 and Table 2). 
These two industries appear the only clear exceptions to the positive relationship between 
borrowing capacity and leverage level. 
   Do manufacturing firms have significant higher leverage because they are the economic 
growth engine in China? Tables 2 and 3 would suggest not as they indicate that there are a 
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number of industries where the mean leverage level was consistently higher than manufacturing. 
These were: conglomerates, construction, utilities and real estate. 
   Although some caution is needed in interpreting these results given the relative small sample 
sizes in some industries, we believe that the results provide substantive evidence to the effect that 
no support can be found for Hypothesis 2; I.e. we do not find that leverage levels are higher in 
manufacturing vis-a-vis other industries. 
   It should be noted that the F-test results show only the utilities industry and to a lesser extent 
the I.T. industry to have leverage levels that are statistically significantly different from 
manufacturing on a consistent basis over time. The general lack of significance may possibly be 
partly a reflection of the small sample in respect to some industries. The lower levels of 
significance in Table 2 may also be partly because leverage measured in terms of LTD/E is 
sensitive to changes in measured equity. So, for example, a fall in equity value can result a 
significant increase in leverage even when there is no change in borrowing. 
   In summary, the results provide some evidence in support of Hypothesis 1; namely, that 
variation in the leverage levels of profitable debt-issuing Chinese listed companies is industry 
dependent. However, Hypothesis 2 is rejected. To explore these issues further more robust 
evidence is required as to why industry membership matters in determining leverage. This is 
investigated in the next section with a regression-based study. 
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4. Hypothesis 3: methodology, results and analysis  
4.1 Methodology and model 
Regression models using between-industry data can be run using pooled data if heterogeneity is 
not pervasive. Poolability F-tests undertaken on a cross-sectional basis indicated that the data 
was not poolable. This is not surprising given the between-industry differences in size and 
borrowing capacity identified in the dataset. 
   We argue that the within-industry samples used in this d study are likely to be more 
homogeneous than the between-industry samples given the dataset characteristics. It can be 
noted from the ‘Test Sample’ dataset in Table 1 that for most industries the standard deviation of 
listed company debt borrowing capacity is low relative to their industry means.  
   The data can be pooled on a time basis only if time-related heterogeneity is not pervasive given 
that heterogeneity can lead to bias (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). In order for this approach to be 
tenable the efficiency gains from pooling need to be shown to more than offset bias associated 
with any heterogeneity within the dataset. Tests presented In Table 4 confirm that, with the 
possible exception of the construction and wholesale/retail industries, the data is poolable over 
time. 
   The methodology employed is to pool the within-industry data on a time basis and to run the 
same regression model across each industry. A series of parameter comparison tests (Clogg et al. 
1992) are then undertaken and the results of these are reported in Table 5. These tests identify 
whether or not there are statistically significant between-industry differences in the parameter 
values of the explanatory variables. The existence of significant differences would imply that 
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industry membership does matter in terms of what impact an individual variable has on leverage. 
We would argue that this approach can have advantages over a panel based methodology. 
Baltagi et al. (2000) for example, argue that even panel estimators with heterogeneous 
coefficients are generally inferior in forecasting performance compared to pooled estimators.  
The variables used in the leverage regression models are as follows: 
Dependent variable: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  
𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 .
 
Where: 
LTD     Long-Term Debt 
TA   Total Assets 
 
We considered both definitions used in Tables 2 and 3. Our preferred measure reflects the greater 
parameter stability found in using this definition for estimates in Table 3.  
Independent variables: 
The independent variables used fall into two principal categories that, we argue, are industry-
dependent determinants of debt capacity. The first group relate to factors influencing borrowing 
power. The second group relate to profitability.  
Borrowing Power related variables: 
 
Size        [Dummy variable which =1 where total assets are over 15 billion Yuan, which is 
               the mean for listed firms in 2007; expected positive relationship]. 
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This variable takes into consideration the relatively under-developed nature of the Shanghai bond 
market which will make it relatively more difficult for smaller companies to raise funds through 
the issuing of debt. We would expect larger companies to have greater access to the market. 
Listed      [Number of years the company has been listed; expected relationship positive]. 
 
It might be expected that companies with a relatively short track record may find raising debt 
finance more difficult. 
 
𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝐶𝑎𝑝 =
𝑇𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
      [Borrowing capacity (or in less formal terms-borrowing power);      
                                        Tangible Fixed Assets/ Total Assets; expected relationship positive] 
 
This variable measures the proportion of assets that can be implicitly considered as collateral 
assets.  
 
Profitability related variables 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅. =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡
(𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1)/2.
−
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡
( 𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡−1)/2.
 
 
[Difference between investment return and borrowing costs; expected relationship positivevi]. 
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It will only make commercial sense to borrow if average investment returns exceed average 
borrowing costs. The expectation is that the greater the difference then the greater incentive to 
borrow.  
 
𝑃. 𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡−1)/2
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
  
 
[Two year average EBIT /Total Assets; expected relationship positive]. 
 
This variable measures the profitability of a firm relative to total assets. Volatility is partly 
smoothed by measuring profitability in terms of the two year average EBIT.  
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝐺 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
   
 
[Earnings growth rate; expected relationship positive]. 
 
Potential leverage will depend not only on absolute profitability but also on the rate of profit 
growth. This is because a rapid rate of growth is an indication to a potential bond investor of 
company stability and lower financial risk. 
 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 2002−2007
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇2002−2007
 
 
[Earnings volatility; expected negative relationship] 
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The final profitability dimension in the model relates to earnings volatility. The measure used is 
the coefficient of variation for EBIT from the period 2002-2007.  
4.2 Results 
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 4 below. The ‘Total’ model, shown 
in Column 1, identifies that across the Shanghai market as a whole the borrowing power related 
variables show greater statistical significance than the profitability related variables. The firm 
Size, number of years Listed and the potential borrowing capacity (BorrowCap) are all 
significant at the 1% level. It can be noted however that the sign on Listed is contrary to initial 
expectations. Of the profitability related variables only the difference between investment returns 
and borrowing costs (ExcessR) is significant in the ‘Total’ model. A caveat that can be added is 
that this variable is itself only found to be significant in respect to two individual industries.  
   If the individual industry models are examined in more detail what appears to stand out is that 
BorrowCap is both consistently positive and highly significant across all industries except 
wholesale/retail. The parameter values do however vary from industry to industry which 
suggests there are industry-related differences in the ways in which the capacity effect impacts 
on borrowing behaviour. 
   The other two borrowing power related variables show considerable more industry-related 
variability in terms of parameter size, sign and significance. This indicates that their relationship 
with leverage is not consistent across industries. It can be noted that the Size parameter is 
significant in some industries but not in others and it is also negative in relation to mining/oil. In 
respect to Listing, the parameter values also show variations between industries in relation to 
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both the significance and the sign. The negative relationship found in the manufacturing industry 
may possibly indicate that in a fast growing industry being an established firm with a known 
‘history’ is not important and could in fact be seen to have negative connotations by 
investors/lenders looking for new ventures and future potential. 
 
 
  
Table 4a: Time-pooled regression results by industry for companies listed on a continuous 
basis 2002-2007. Dependent variable = LTD/TA 
 
 
 
 
Total 
 
Manufacturing 
 
Agriculture a 
 
Conglomerates 
 
Construction 
 
Utilities 
Constant 0.03099*** 0.00167 0.05802* 0.04858* -0.02028 -0.13386* 
Size 0.06072*** 0.04181***  0.22547*** 0.00893 0.06169** 
Listed -0.00180*** -0.00165*** -0.00611* 0.00069 0.00858*** -0.00198 
BorrowCap 0.17479*** 0.21776*** 0.11600** 0.08053** 0.21967*** 0.45633*** 
 
ExcessR 
 
 
0.00001*** 0.00001** 0.00002 0.00003** -0.00001 -0.00004 
P.Ability -0.00811 -0.00095 -0.01816 -0.01651 -0.02957 -0.16142** 
Profit G 0.00121 0.00142 0.0066 0.00266 0.00056 0.00050 
Volatility 0.00034 0.00016 0.00194 -0.00012 0.00830 0.00460* 
 
Poolability 
Testb 
1.309 1.273 1.272 1.475 2.882* 1.674 
sample 2681 1491 72 125 85 179 
Adj- R2 0.194 0.192 0.146 0.294 0.252 0.2814 
 
 
Notes: The top 3 explanatory variables in italics relate to borrowing power with the remainder being profitability-related factors; 
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%; aSample issues lead to the omission of the size variable; bF-Test 
for Poolability over time; Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates data is not poolable; Differences in sample sizes mean that the 
critical value varies between industries. 𝐹𝑜𝑏𝑠 =
(𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑑−∑ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟)/(𝑇−1)𝐾
∑ 𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟/𝑇(𝑛−𝐾)
, 𝑑𝑓 = 𝐹(𝑇−1)𝐾,𝑇(𝑛−𝑘); Where T= number of firms, K= 
number of model parameters. 
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Table 4b: Time-pooled regression results by industry for companies listed on a 
continuous basis 2002-2007. Dependent variable = LTD/TA 
 
 IT Mining/Oil Real Estate Wholesale/Retail Others 
Constant 0.01297 0.05916 0.13978*** 0.05541*** -0.00397 
Size 0.01044 -0.04741* 0.04951 0.00233 0.07311*** 
Listed -0.00082 -0.01007** 0.00205 -0.00029 -0.00020 
BorrowCap 0.13595*** 0.25881*** -0.14913** 0.01862 0.21986*** 
      
ExcessR 0.00001 -0.00002 0.00001 0.00001 0.00002 
P.Ability -0.02834 -0.32606*** -0.1029 -0.00671 -0.00498 
Profit G 0.00042 0.01553 0.00583 0.00954** -0.00565 
Volatility 0.00140 -0.03780** 0.02336** 0.0031 0.00166 
 
 
Poolability  
test  
2.068 
 
1.74 2.378 a 1.973 
Sample 107 87 90 162 283 
Adj- R2 0.214 0.119 0.080 0.016 0.169 
 
Notes: See Table 4a in respect to tests undertaken; ainsufficient observations in some variables to compute test 
over the full period. 
   Our third hypothesis postulates that industry related differences in leverage can be explained in 
terms of debt capacity (borrowing power and profitability) differences. From Table 4 it can be 
noted that the borrowing power variables are largely significant and of the expected sign. The 
influence of profitability however is limited; only ExcessR is both of the expected sign and 
significant in both the market as a whole and manufacturing. 
   Table 4 does not consider whether or not borrowing power and profitability factors can explain 
differences in leverage between industries. We examine this issue in Table 5 which explores 
whether or not the values of individual industry parameters show statistically significantly 
differences from the manufacturing ‘base case’. We apply the Clogg et al. (1992) test for 
equality of regression parameter coefficients; this test is conditional on the application of the 
same regression model for both data groups.  
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   Table 5 reveals statistically significant industry-related differences for most variables. For 
example, in respect to BorrowCap, significant differences from the manufacturing ‘base case’ 
are found in respect to 5 of the 8 industries tested. It can also be noted that there is no 
consistency in respect to the signs of these differences; 4 signs are negative and 4 signs are 
positive. These findings indicate to us that even though debt capacity appears to influence the 
level of leverage (Table 4), the between-industry differences in parameter values shows us that 
these variables cannot be used to explain why leverage is higher or lower in one industry in 
comparison with another. We therefore reject Hypothesis 3 and conclude that industry 
membership does matter. Even though borrowing capacity and profitability are important 
variables they have been found to affect different industries in different ways. In effect there is 
no ‘one size fits all’ debt capacity focused capital structure model that can be applied across 
different Chinese industries.  
   We would argue that our research provides additional tentative evidence to question the 
relevance of both Pecking Order Theory and Trade Off Theory in the Chinese context. The 
former suggests there should be a negative relationship between leverage and profitability 
(assuming that profitability is cash generating) and the latter suggests that we should find a 
positive relationship (as profitable firms need to borrow more to enjoy tax shield benefits). We 
argue that the lack of consistency between industries in both the sign and significance of the 
profitability-related variables in Table 4 indicates that neither theory can be used with confidence 
to explain the industry-based differences found in China. Our result can be contrasted with other 
studies made in an emerging market context. For example, Sheikh and Wang (2011) found 
evidence to suggest that capital structure in Pakistan was consistent with both Trade-off Theory 
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and Pecking order Theory. A further study by Al-Narrar and Taylor (2008) argues that in Jordan 
firms follow the same determinants of capital structure as developed markets. 
 
Table 5: Statistical significancea of industry-related parameter differences relative to the 
manufacturing industry 
 
 Conglomerate 
 
Construction Utilities I.T. Mining/oil Real estate Wholesale/
retail 
Others 
Constant 1.653* -0.809 -1.964** 0.689 1.221 5.196*** 2.954*** -0.171 
Size 3.973*** -0.910 0.698 -1.227 -2.965*** 0.159 -0.845 1.266 
Listed 1.047 3.915*** -0.134 0.549 -2.147** 1.471 0.894 0.646 
BorrowCap -3.287*** 0.031 2.674*** -2.421** 0.509 -5.469*** -7.491*** 0.054 
         
ExcessR 0.006 -0.002 -0.004 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 
P.Ability -2.027** -2.410** -20.427*** -3.522*** -16.851*** -8.663**** -0.721 -0.427 
Profit G 0.040 -0.008 -0.013 -0.033 0.131 0.018 0.077 -0.347 
Volatility -1.167 33.917*** 18.500*** 5.167*** -158.167*** 96.667*** 12.250*** 6.250*** 
         
Notes: The top 3 explanatory variables shown in italics relate to borrowing power with the remainder relating to profitability; 
Agriculture is excluded from the tests as the pooled regression omits the size variable due to insufficient data; ***Significant at 1%;  
**Significant at 5%;  *Significant at 10%;  aThe Clogg test is based on a Z-statistic. Acceptance of the null hypothesis indicates no 
difference between the means 
 
𝑍 =
𝛽1−𝛽2
√𝑆𝐸𝛽1
2+𝑆𝐸𝛽2
2
.   
 
 
 
   Table 5 above also provide additional support for Hypothesis 1; our finding of statistically 
significantly between-industry differences in respect to the impact of debt capacity factors on 
leverage indicates that variations in leverage will be industry dependent. The results also provide 
additional evidence against Hypothesis 2 as it can be inferred that there appear to be no clear and 
unequivocal systematic differences between the manufacturing industry and other industries in 
terms of the ways in which the explanatory variables influence leverage.  
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5. Is China a ‘special case’ in the context of capital structure?   
 
We list some of our thoughts on the reasons why the leverage levels of profitable Chinese listed 
companies differ to those in Western countries and therefore why China may need to be 
considered as a ‘special case’ in the context of capital structure theory. 
 
Relatively underdeveloped corporate bond markets 
It has been well documented that there is a propensity for Chinese firms use short-term bank 
borrowing in preference to long-term debt (Hale, 2007). The reason for this may just be that the 
corporate bond market has not developed to a degree that enables listed companies to issue the 
debt needed to create optimal capital structures. 
   The need to promote the development of the corporate bond market is acknowledged by the 
Chinese monetary authorities. For example, the governor of the Peoples bank of China in 2005 
stated: “China’s underdeveloped corporate bond market has distorted the financing structure in 
the economy, which poses a threat to financial stability, as well as to social and economic 
development.” (Zhou, 2006). He went on to list a series of mistakes committed during the late 
1980s and mid-1990s that had impeded the development of the market. These ranged from a lack 
of a credit rating system to the targeting of retail rather than institutional investors and also a lack 
of investor education. It may possibly be the case in the long run that as the corporate debt 
market develops Western capital structure models will become more applicable to Chinese firms. 
However, there may also be cultural issues that place limits on such development.  
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Cultural factors 
Cultural factors were identified by Sekely and Collins (1988) as having a significant influence on 
industry-related leverage differences between countries. It might be expected that the cultural 
aversion to borrowing found in Chinese society might in part explain why lower leverage levels 
are found in Chinese listed companies than in their developed country peers (Hale, 2007). 
   The Chinese in general do not like to borrow. The tendency to save and not borrow was 
highlighted by Zhou when he was the governor of the People's Bank of Chinavii. He identified 
that China's 2007 domestic savings rate of almost half of gross domestic product was far too 
highviii and indicated that it was a function of social and cultural factors. He said: “… change … 
may be a slow process, especially when you want to change national traditions, cultural impacts, 
family structures and demographics". It is difficult to say with confidence that the behaviour and 
attitudes of a country’s individuals to saving and borrowing will also be reflected in attitudes and 
behaviour at the company level. However, we believe that using such a hypothesis to explain of 
the unwillingness of Chinese firms to use higher leverage merits further investigation.  
Individual firm factors 
There are a number of papers suggesting that firm factors, or within-industry-effects, can have a 
significant impact on leverage; for example, MacKay and Phillips (2005). Other papers can be 
cited that have found substantial between-industry differences in the amount of within-industry 
leverage variability; for example, Almazan and Molina (2005). Care needs to be taken in the 
interpretation of such studies.  It is arguable that their findings could possibly reflect outliers in 
their data. In our study, as discussed above, sampling procedures have been careful to eliminate 
outliers.  
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6. Conclusions and suggested future research 
This paper examines whether or not leverage differences found between Chinese listed firms 
prior to the 2007 financial crisis were industry related. It also examines whether or not the 
‘engine’ of Chinese economic development, namely the manufacturing industry, was a ‘special 
case’ in respect to leverage. It is found that leverage was not generally higher in the 
manufacturing industry; in fact it was lower than in some other industries. It was also identified 
that industry membership did matter when it came to what determined leverage levels. Detailed 
analysis based on industry-by-industry regression found that firms’ leverage levels in China were 
largely industry dependent and determined more by borrowing power than by profitability. The 
lack of a significant profitability effect is surprising but possibly reflects the uncertainty 
surrounding profit growth rates in what was (and still is) a very rapidly expanding economy. We 
also concluded that manufacturing industry cannot be considered as unique or a ‘special case’ in 
any way. Leverage levels were not found to be significantly higher, and in respect to the 
variables that determine leverage, there did not seem to be any clear and unequivocal differences 
compared to other industries. 
   Another important finding was that between-industry leverage differences could not be 
explained by either borrowing-capacity-related factors or profitability-related factors. We 
speculate that this may be because of business environment issues; for example, that the 
development of the Chinese corporate bond market had been relatively slow and that leverage 
levels were low for Chinese listed firms compared to their Western counterparts. It may also be 
that that this lack of significance partly related to cultural environment issues; specifically the 
widespread aversion in China to debt and borrowing. It remains to be seen whether or not with 
the passage of time the factors which influence leverage levels in the West will become more 
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influential in China as well. The period covered by this study can be identified as being one of 
rapid economic growth where a generally benign financial environment led to increases in 
profitability and relatively low levels of perceived borrowing risk. It may very well be that in 
less rosy economic times borrowing will become harder as a significant economic slow-down 
would affect both the ability and the willingness of fiscally cautious firms to borrow. We also 
must not lose sight of the fact that China economically is still an emerging nation where financial 
markets such as the corporate debt market are still nothing like as developed as those found in 
the West. It is therefore very difficult to predict the future shape of capital structure in China. An 
interesting follow-up study might be to examine if the same relationships still hold in 10 years 
time.  
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i Differences in leverage may be also potentially be explained by: agency problems, pecking 
order preferences and cultural and institutional factors. These are a potential area for future 
research. In this paper we focus on the borrowing power and profitability as we believe they are 
more directly related to individual industry characteristics. 
ii It would also be interesting to study firms' capital structure decisions post-financial crisis but 
this is left for a future study. 
iii The Debt Capacity is measured by the ratio of Tangible Fixed Assets/Total Assets on the 
assumption that firms with higher fixed assets as collateral find it easier to borrow money. It can 
be noted that this is one of a number of factors that will impact on a firm’s ability to borrow. 
 
iv Shenying Wanguo Securities found that from 1990-2012 only 77 companies had been delisted 
across the whole of China.  See: http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2013/03/20/delisting-in-china-exists-
in-name-only/. Access date: 09/10/2013. 
v Not shown in Tables but available from the authors on request. 
vi This hypothesis is based on Trade Off Theory. A negative sign would provide support to 
Pecking Order Theory.  
vii Source:http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNewsAndPR/idUSPEK23112320090210 
(access date: 12/11/2010). 
 
viii This can be compared with the USA savings rate which declined from an average of 11 % of 
national income 1960 -1979 to as little as 1% in 2005. Source: OECD National Accounts, 
Volume II, various years. 
 
